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A “WORKPLACE EXCEPTION”: EXPLORING THE LEGAL 
LOOPHOLE THAT ALLOWS FOR WARRANTLESS GPS 
TRACKING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES’ PERSONAL 
VEHICLES 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
Cunningham v. New York State Department of Labor1 
(decided June 27, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public employees in New York once enjoyed an undisputed 
right to privacy with respect to their personal automobiles.2  Howev-
er, such privacy is no longer guaranteed after the New York Court of 
Appeals decision in Cunningham v. New York State Department of 
Labor.3  The workplace exception, a legal device that excuses em-
ployers from obtaining a warrant to conduct a search of an employee 
within the “workplace,” now provides government employers with a 
broad discretion that seems to contradict the inherent purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 12 of the New York State Constitution.4  The Court of Ap-
peals in Cunningham created this loophole by expanding the defini-
tion of “workplace” to allow a government employer to monitor an 
employee’s personal vehicle during the employee’s business day.5  
 
1 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1200-01 (N.Y. 2009) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648-49 (1979)). 
3 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 474. 
4 Id. at 471 (“[T]he State argues, and we agree, that this search is within the ‘workplace’ 
exception to the warrant requirement recognized in O’Connor . . . and Caruso . . . .”) (inter-
nal citations omitted)); see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); see also Matter of Ca-
ruso v. Ward, 530 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1988); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see N.Y. CONST. 
art. I, § 12. 
5 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470, 472 (“We thus conclude that when an employee 
chooses to use his car during the business day, GPS tracking of the car may be considered a 
1
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The court’s expanded view is alarming because it shackles a funda-
mental right of every employee in the public sector—subjecting pri-
vate citizens employed by the government to a continuous unwar-
ranted Global Positioning System (“GPS”) search and divulging 
every place those employees visit, even if only during business 
hours.6  In essence, after this decision, the government has unfettered 
discretion to track its employees during their breaks or lunch hours, 
even if those employees are on personal business in their own respec-
tive privately-owned vehicles.7 
Despite the court’s ultimate decision to suppress GPS evi-
dence for other reasons, the court’s definition of the “workplace” has 
opened the door to overly intrusive searches in the future.8  The 
“workplace exception” gives employers authority to conduct searches 
of an employee’s personal possessions outside of an employee’s of-
fice building, even in locations that are well beyond the parking lot 
surrounding the workplace.9  The court defended its reasoning by 
stating that employees have “a greater expectation of privacy in the 
location of their bodies” or accompanying belongings such as a 
purse, clothing, or shoes, than in a vehicle’s location.10  Yet, using a 
GPS device to locate an employee’s vehicle is merely an indirect 
means of locating an employee’s body.11  Thus, as warned by the 
concurrence, employers will be empowered to electronically track an 
employee’s personal vehicle even if the vehicle is used for a transito-
ry work-related purpose, such as traveling “to and from work.”12 
 
workplace search.”). 
6 Id. at 473 (“Perhaps it would be impossible, or unreasonably difficult, so to limit a GPS 
search of an employee’s car as to eliminate all surveillance of private activity—especially 
when the employee chooses to go home in the middle of the day . . . .”). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 470-71, 473 (stating that the evidence was suppressed because the Department did 
not make a “reasonable effort to avoid tracking” the employee during his personal activities); 
see also Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 604 F. Supp. 2d 665, 
675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Although the term ‘work-related’ was used by the O’Connor 
Court, neither O’Connor nor the cases considered by the Court in reaching its holding in-
volved any area physically outside of the workplace”). 
9 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472 (declining to follow petitioner’s suggestion to confine 
the workplace exception to “the workplace itself, or . . . workplace-issued property that can 
be seen as an extension of the workplace.”). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 470, 476-77 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
12 Id. at 476-77 (“No New York court has ever permitted government employers to search 
employees’ personal cars without a warrant, and the majority creates a dangerous precedent 
2
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II. CUNNINGHAM V. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
A. Facts 
Cunningham, the Director of Staff and Organizational Devel-
opment of the New York State Department of Labor (“Department”), 
was suspected of taking unpermitted absences and forging his em-
ployment time records.13  Pursuant to an investigation and discipli-
nary proceeding, the State of New York attached a GPS device to 
Cunningham’s personal car without a warrant or his knowledge.14  
The device was installed at the order of the Inspector General while 
Cunningham’s car was located in a parking lot near the office.15 
The GPS device was used to record Cunningham’s move-
ments and location for an entire month and generated machine evi-
dence that led to the charges disputed in this case.16  The Department 
tracked Cunningham outside of business hours, including evenings, 
weekends, and even throughout the duration of the employee’s family 
vacation in another state.17  The GPS records demonstrated that Cun-
ningham’s manually logged arrival and departure times differed from 
the vehicle’s actual movements, and, thus, the Department was able 
to infer his dishonesty.18  Cunningham brought an Article 78 proceed-
ing to challenge the Commissioner’s finding of employee misconduct 
based on the GPS evidence.19  The Department’s decision to termi-
nate Cunningham was affirmed by the Appellate Division, but the 
 
by allowing them to do so now.”). 
13 Id. at 470. 
14 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470. 
15 Id.  The court in Cunningham did not indicate whether the employee’s car was parked 
in a lot owned by the Department. 
16 The court in Cunningham explained that: 
Four of [the] 11 charges were dependent on evidence obtained from the 
GPS device.  As to three charges, the GPS information showed that peti-
tioner’s times of arrival at and departure from his office were incon-
sistent with the number of hours he claimed, on time records he submit-
ted, to have worked.  A fourth charge was based on petitioner’s approval 
of time records showing his secretary was working during hours when 
the GPS information showed that he was visiting her home. 
Id. at 470-71.  
17 Id. at 471. 
18 Id. 
19 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 471. 
3
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New York State Court of Appeals reversed.20 
B. Majority Opinion 
The Court of Appeals held that the Department’s act of plac-
ing a GPS device on Cunningham’s vehicle in order to track the em-
ployee’s location constituted a search—an inspection of an area that a 
person would reasonably expect to be kept private—subject to the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 12 of the New York State Constitution.21  The majority also 
found that the Department had reasonable suspicion or grounds to 
suspect employee misconduct.22  Thus, the main issue presented to 
the Court of Appeals was whether tracking Cunningham’s move-
ments in a personal vehicle throughout his scheduled business day 
and during his personal activities, was reasonable under the New 
York State Constitution.23 
In deciding this issue, the court considered whether the search 
was an unnecessary interference into Cunningham’s right to priva-
cy.24  An employer is justified in conducting a search without a war-
rant if it is both reasonable in scope and necessary to its initial objec-
tives.25  Further, the search must be in alignment with the employee’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”26  Cunningham was required by 
the Department to report his arrival and departure times, which di-
minished the privacy he could expect in his location during scheduled 
working hours.27  Yet, the Department’s attempt to verify Cunning-
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 470-71 (“We decided in Weaver, and the Supreme Court decided in Jones, that 
the attachment by law enforcement officers of a GPS device to the automobile of a criminal 
suspect, and the use of that device to track the suspect’s movements, was a search subject to 
constitutional limitations.”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) 
(holding that a personal vehicle is an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment which protects 
the possession from being unreasonably searched); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see N.Y. 
CONST. art I, § 12. 
22 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473. 
23 Id. at 472. 
24 Id. at 472-73 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); and N.J. v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 
325, 326 (1985)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 474 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
27 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472 (explaining that an employee has a diminished expec-
tation of privacy in his personal car because he has to report arrival and departure times to 
4
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ham’s location through a GPS search was tainted because the gov-
ernment employer unnecessarily documented Cunningham’s leisure 
activities.28 
The Department had the ability, but nevertheless, failed to 
remove the GPS device from the employee’s vehicle, which led to the 
tracking of Cunningham’s personal movements for an entire month.29  
Even though the majority held that surveillance devices designed to 
record the whereabouts of an employee’s personal car for work-
related purposes are permitted within the “workplace exception,” 
tracking Cunningham outside of his scheduled business hours was ir-
relevant to the Department’s purpose for the search of investigating 
occupational misconduct, and thus, the search was excessive.30 
Generally, if a search is excessive, any evidence that does not 
exceed the “permissible scope” of the investigation may be used in 
court.31  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals in Cunningham did not 
follow the general rule because of the inherent power of a GPS de-
vice to substantially invade the privacy of an individual.32  Because 
the Department did not make any effort to limit the privacy invasion, 
the search was unconstitutional and all of the evidence was sup-
pressed.33 
However, the Court of Appeals created an exception excusing 
employers from having to obtain warrants to attach GPS devices to 
an employee’s automobile if they can claim that it is reasonable and 
necessary to a work related matter.34  The employer need only make a 
“reasonable effort” to stop the GPS tracking after business hours; yet, 
“reasonable effort” was not defined and only negligible restrictions 
are in place to limit the scope of these types of searches.35 
 
his employer). 
28 Id. at 470, 473. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 473 (citing United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
32 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473 (quoting Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (describing the all-
encompassing ability of a GPS device as “[c]onstant, relentless tracking of anything”)). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 470, 472. 
35 Id. at 473. 
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III. FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” 
In light of advancing technologies, which allow people to 
conduct searches without physically touching the property being in-
vestigated, the Supreme Court of the United States in Katz v. United 
States36 applied the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.”37  In de-
termining whether a search was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, the decision did not ignore the historical relevance of 
property rights.38  Rather, it delineated an even broader range of pri-
vacy violations which are protected under the Constitution.39 
The Court found that police officers illegally interfered with 
an individual’s privacy rights by listening and recording phone calls 
made by that individual in a public phone booth.40  Prior to the Katz 
decision, a physical trespass upon tangible property was required to 
invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.41  However, after 
Katz, placing an eavesdropping device on the outside of a public tele-
phone booth in order to gain private information constitutes a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment under federal law.42 
The Court’s reasoning in Katz relied on an individual’s “ex-
pectation of privacy” in his or her person or belongings and justifia-
ble reliance on that expectation.43  For example, an individual who 
 
36 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
37 Id. at 361; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951, 952 (“The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”). 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see Katz, 
389 U.S. at 353. 
39 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
40 Id. at 348, 358. 
41 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 466 (1928) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects property not people and that a telephone wiretap is not a privacy intrusion sufficient 
to invoke protection under the Fourth Amendment). 
42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (holding that the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” 
and overruling the exclusive property-based approach in Olmstead). 
43 Id. at 353 (“The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the 
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the tele-
phone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
6
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enters a telephone booth to place a call intends to keep the conversa-
tion private and may reveal certain information that he or she would 
otherwise refrain from disclosing in a public setting.44  Essentially, 
the Fourth Amendment protects individuals rather than property or 
locations.45  The Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen46 adopt-
ed the concurrence’s view in Katz, which further emphasized that a 
person has the right to be free from excessive governmental intru-
sions if he or she has an expectation of privacy that is reasonable in 
the eyes of society.47  As long as an individual makes an effort to 
keep the object or exchange private, whether it is a possession or a 
conversation made within an enclosed area, it is protected.48  If the 
petitioner in Katz placed the call while leaving the phone booth door 
open, without making any effort to conceal the conversation from 
third parties, society would not recognize an expectation of privacy.49 
Furthermore, one does not waive constitutional protection 
simply because he or she can be visually observed in a transparent 
booth or public space by third parties.50  Constitutional protections 
that shield against unreasonable searches are not lost even when the 
 
44 Id. at 352 (holding that an individual using a public telephone booth is “entitled to as-
sume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.  To 
read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has 
come to play in private communication.”). 
45 Id. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and 
not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the 
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into any given enclosure.”). 
46 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
47 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.  The concurrence in Katz stated: 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person has exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”  Thus a 
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but 
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of 
outsiders are not “protected” because no intention to keep them to him-
self has been exhibited.  On the other hand, conversations in the open 
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
48 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
49 Id. (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even 
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”). 
50 Id. 
7
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object is placed in a publicly accessible area, such as a parking lot.51  
Although the act of observing the physical appearance of an individ-
ual or the outside of a car is not constitutionally impermissible, an in-
dividual does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy in his or 
her movements while driving a vehicle or walking along a road.52 
The Court in United States v. Jones,53 pointed out that a viola-
tion under the Fourth Amendment should be determined by an analy-
sis of the inherent privacy expectations attached to the constitutional-
ly protected area that is searched.54  Jones mandated that citizens 
receive the same amount of privacy that the Framers intended at the 
time of the Fourth Amendment’s enactment.55  Thus, the Court’s ap-
plication requires a minimum amount of protection that a citizen 
would have benefitted from at that time.56  The conservation of these 
rights is embedded in the meaning behind the concept of a “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy,” and these protections are based upon the 
realistic beliefs of society.57  By way of these layers of constitutional 
protection, any government encroachment in the absence of trespass 
could be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.58 
 
51 Id. 
52 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979).  The Court stated: 
An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its 
use are subject to government regulation . . . .  People are not shorn of all 
Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the 
public sidewalk; nor are they shorn of those interests when they step 
from the sidewalks into their automobiles. 
Id. 
53 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
54 Id. at 951. 
55 Id. at 947 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 34 (2001) (“[A]t bottom, we must 
‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against [the] government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’ ”). 
56 Id. at 953 (“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, 
which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it 
was adopted.”). 
57 Id. at 951 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“We have embodied 
that preservation of past rights in our very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
which we have said to be an expectation ‘that has a source outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings 
that are recognized and permitted by society.’ ”)). 
58 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of 
surveillance.  With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the 
monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking 
devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”). 
8
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B. “Reasonableness” of a Search 
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search is 
presumptively unreasonable without prior judicial approval.59  A ju-
dicial order is imperative to the enforcement of sufficient safeguards 
in favor of citizens because it enables a neutral judge to set specific 
limitations by way of a warrant and in advance of a search.60  With-
out this order, government officials may encroach upon a citizen’s 
privacy with little restraint.61  Likewise, it is difficult for a judge to 
correct the situation in hindsight, especially when an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights have already been violated.62 
The Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.63 enumerated factors that 
should be taken into account when determining whether a warrantless 
search by a public entity is reasonable: (1) the context of the location 
where the search took place; (2) the necessity of the search balanced 
with the privacy invasion to the individual; and (3) whether the indi-
vidual’s expectation of privacy was appropriate.64  A search lacking 
probable cause may nevertheless be upheld if the public interest out-
 
59 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). 
60 Id. at 356 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 272 (1960) (“[T]he proce-
dure of antecedent justification that is central to the Fourth Amendment procedure that we 
hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this 
case.”). 
61 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (“If subjective good faith alone were the test, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.”). 
62 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 96 (“Omission of such authorization 
‘bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and 
substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the 
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judg-
ment.’ ”)). 
63 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
64 The Court stated that: 
[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes 
place.  The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing 
any specific class of searches requires “balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails.”  On one side of the bal-
ance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and 
personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective 
methods to deal with breaches of public order. 
Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967)). 
9
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weighs the intrusion to the citizen.65  Likewise, the warrant require-
ment may also be overcome in circumstances where a time constraint 
renders a warrant unrealistic or impossible, such as a setting where 
public order must be maintained.66 
T.L.O. explained that absolute certainty is not required—
“reasonable suspicion” or “sufficient probability” can be enough to 
make a search reasonable under the Constitution.67  Still, there must 
be a good faith basis that the evidence exists in order to conduct a 
search.68  If the search bares evidence unrelated to the scope of the 
inspection’s purpose, the court must consider the reasonableness of 
the original search and the question of whether a sufficient nexus ex-
isted between the evidence and the original intrusion to determine 
whether suppression is warranted.69 
In O’Connor v. Ortega,70 the Court upheld a warrantless 
search of an employee because it would be both “unduly burden-
some” and disruptive to business if the employer were required to ob-
tain a warrant each time it needed to access an employee’s business 
files.71  A search to secure property is valid if the employer has a rea-
sonable belief that government-owned property is contained in an 
 
65 The concurrence explained that: 
The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches 
and seizures be reasonable, and although “both the concept of probable 
cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a 
search . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.”  Thus, 
we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and 
seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to 
the level of probable cause.  Where a careful balancing of governmental 
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of proba-
ble cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard. 
Id. at 340-41 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 
266, 277 (1973)). 
66 Id. at 339 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (“Events calling for disci-
pline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.”)). 
67 Id. at 346 (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). 
68 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346 (quoting Hill, 401 U.S. at 797, 804 (“But the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: ‘sufficient probability, not 
certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . . . .’ ”)). 
69 Id. at 345. 
70 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 709. 
71 Id. at 722 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 533).  If the process of obtaining a court order 
would frustrate the governmental reason for the search, the warrant requirement is waived. 
10
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employee’s office.72  However, an individual does not lose the right 
to privacy in the workplace merely because he or she works for a 
public employer.73  An employee has an “expectation of privacy . . . 
in his desk and file cabinets” if the items are not shared and if the 
employer does not have any established regulations or policies pre-
cluding the employee from keeping personal items in his or her of-
fice.74  Thus, the search itself must be analyzed by applying “the ap-
propriate standard of reasonableness” within the particular 
employment relationship.75 
The Supreme Court in O’Connor devised a similar test to that 
in T.L.O. to determine whether a search is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.76  First, the search must be warranted at its in-
ception.77  This is satisfied when the employer’s suspicion of an em-
ployee’s wrongdoing is reasonably grounded in the belief that evi-
dence will be gained by the search.78  The second requirement is 
based on the reasoning in T.L.O., which required the search to be ap-
propriately connected to the employer’s initial goal.79  Hence, the 
methods used to conduct the search must be reasonably associated 
with its original purpose and the means cannot exceed those which 
are necessary.80 
C. The “Workplace Exception” and Other 
Exemptions to the Warrant Requirement 
In O’Connor, the Supreme Court followed the “workplace 
exception,” which exempts employers from obtaining a warrant to 
 
72 Id. at 728 (“A search to secure state property is valid as long as petitioners had a rea-
sonable belief that there was government property in Dr. Ortega’s office which needed to be 
secured, and the scope of the intrusion was itself reasonable in light of this justification.”). 
73 Id. at 717. 
74 Id. at 710. 
75 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719. 
76 Id. at 726 (referring to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), and T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
341).  See also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536). 
77 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
78 Id. (“Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be ‘justified at its 
inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evi-
dence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary 
for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file.”). 
79 Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341). 
80 Id. 
11
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conduct a routine or investigatory search of an employee.81  Unlike 
the court in Cunningham, the Court in O’Connor defined the “work-
place” to include objects that are controlled or owned by an employer 
or those personal items openly exposed within the workplace envi-
ronment.82  The Court explained that the workplace is not all-
inclusive and personal items within the building do not inevitably 
qualify under the “workplace exception.”83  Instead, the determina-
tion should be based upon an individual’s reasonable “expectation of 
privacy in the contents of” a possession in light of objective “societal 
expectations” of privacy in one’s employment.84  Most importantly, 
the O’Connor rule explicitly prohibited a sealed personal item from 
being searched under this exception.85 
The presence of “ ‘special needs’ beyond normal law en-
forcement [or an emergency] . . . may [also] justify departures from 
the” warrant requirements.86  In Wiley v. Department of Justice,87 a 
 
81 Id. at 722. 
82 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472.  However, the Supreme Court specified that: 
The workplace includes those areas and items that are related to work 
and are generally within the employer's control.  At a hospital, 
for example, the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, 
among other areas, are all part of the workplace.  These areas remain 
part of the workplace context even if the employee has placed personal 
items in them, such as a photograph placed in a desk or a letter posted on 
an employee bulletin board. 
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16. 
83 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716. 
84 The Court in O’Connor stated: 
Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address 
can be considered part of the workplace context, however.  An employee 
may bring closed luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip, or a 
handbag or briefcase each workday.  While whatever expectation of pri-
vacy the employee has in the existence and the outward appearance of 
the luggage is affected by its presence in the workplace, the employee’s 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the luggage is not affected in 
the same way.  The appropriate standard for a workplace search does not 
necessarily apply to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag or a 
briefcase that happens to be within the employer's business address . . . .  
As with the expectation of privacy in one’s home, such an expectation in 
one’s place of work is “based upon societal expectations that have deep 
roots in the history of the Amendment.” 
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984)). 
85 Id. at 716 (“The appropriate standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply 
to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag or a briefcase that happens to be within the 
employer’s business address.”). 
86 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). 
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prison employee was suspected of having contraband in his car on 
work premises and in clear violation of a recognized policy.88  In 
light of the concerns of danger in this context, the Court of Appeals 
in Wiley held that a search of an employee’s vehicle need only be 
“supported by reasonable suspicion.”89  The special facts of this case 
were viewed in conjunction with the government’s immediate need to 
control “the entry of guns and other dangerous weapons” that came 
into the facility in order to preserve safety.90  Nevertheless, the court 
held that this search was unconstitutional because an allegation by an 
“anonymous informant” absent corroboration was unreliable under 
the O’Connor “reasonable suspicion standard.”91  Furthermore, the 
employer took nearly a year to forward this anonymous letter to the 
necessary parties for further investigation, which proved to the court 
that the search was not an emergency.92 
For each particular set of facts, an employee’s expectation of 
privacy can be reduced by office practices, procedures or regulations, 
and the employment relationship itself, which may permit an intru-
sion by an employer.93  Ultimately, the governmental interest in con-
ducting a search for supervisory and operational purposes must be 
balanced against the privacy invasion suffered by the individual.94 
 
87 328 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003)  
88 Id. at 1348-49. 
89 Id. at 1349, 1352 (“The Board concluded that the agency established that the Warden 
had reasonable suspicion to search Wiley's car based on the information available to the 
Warden at the time he ordered the search.”). 
90 Id. at 1353. 
91 Id. at 1349-56; see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724. 
92 Wiley, 328 F.3d at 1356-57. 
93 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (“The operational realities of the workplace, however, may 
make some employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a su-
pervisor rather than a law enforcement official.  Public employees’ expectations of privacy 
in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private 
sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate 
regulation.”). 
94 Id. at 719-20 (“In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must bal-
ance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the govern-
ment’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.”). 
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IV. NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
A. Article I, Section 12 
The first paragraph of article I, section 12 of the New York 
State Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.95  However, the New York State Constitution ex-
panded the safeguards provided to citizens by including interferences 
from technological communications in its protections.96  The New 
York Court of Appeals sought to enforce these constitutional protec-
tions by requiring judicial scrutiny and held that GPS searches with-
out warrants are antithetical to the protections guaranteed by the state 
constitution.97  Furthermore, the court in Cunningham adopted the 
balancing test of the United States Supreme Court to determine “rea-
sonableness,” which weighs the individual’s expectation of privacy 
against the government’s need to conduct a search.98 
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Notice of the likelihood of a search can be provided to an em-
ployee in the form of employment contracts or agreements that set 
 
95 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
96 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable in-
terception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated . . . .”). 
97 The warrantless use of a tracking device is inconsistent with the protections guaranteed 
by their state constitutions.  The Court of Appeals stated: 
Technological advances have produced many valuable tools for law en-
forcement and, as the years go by, the technology available to aid in the 
detection of criminal conduct will only become more and more sophisti-
cated.  Without judicial oversight, the use of these powerful devices pre-
sents a significant and, to our minds, unacceptable risk of abuse.  Under 
our State Constitution, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the in-
stallation and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual's wherea-
bouts requires a warrant supported by probable cause. 
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. 
98 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472 (referring to Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) 
(stating that an employer’s need to conduct a search outweighs the employee’s right to pri-
vacy if the property being searched is “employer-issued”)); see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 
721-22. 
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the terms of hire and, thereby, form a bottom-line for an employee’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.99  In Caruso v. Ward,100 the volun-
teer officers of the specialized Organized Crime Control Bureau 
(“OCCB”) challenged a component of an Interim Order that would 
subject the officers to random drug testing as a requirement to remain 
in the unit.101  In light of the nature of their duties in “hazardous nar-
cotics-related operations,” and their prior agreement, which set forth 
a minimal expectation of privacy upon acceptance of their positions 
in the specialized force, the court held that the drug tests were consti-
tutional.102  In reaching that conclusion, the court in Caruso decided 
that the state’s interest in making sure that the officers were drug free 
was of substantial importance in order to prevent any fatal risk to the 
public or other officers.103  The court also decided that the notice pro-
vided to these employees, regarding the thorough scrutiny to which 
they are subject as a condition of employment, was fundamentally 
fair and reasonably informed.104  Despite the officers’ low expecta-
tion of privacy and the forms they signed when hired, the court de-
termined that searching a personal vehicle would still be an unrea-
 
99 Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 854 (“Of crucial significance in this case is that OCCB members 
have a very diminished expectation of privacy due to their pursuit of service in the elite unit 
based on conditions known in advance . . . .”). 
100 530 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1988). 
101 Id. at 850. 
102 Id. at 851, 853-54 (“[T]heir status, considered with the substantial privacy intrusions to 
which these particular OCCB members and applicants already have subjected themselves, 
reduces their privacy interest to a minimal or insubstantial level such that the admittedly cru-
cial State interest justifies the random testing.”). 
103 Id. at 855 (“It is not melodramatic to note even the potentially fatal risks to fellow of-
ficers and others if a drug-abusing OCCB officer is called upon to use a weapon while under 
the influence of drugs in inherently high-risk assignments.  The terror-filled world they are 
working in requires the sternest precautionary safeguards to weed out drug abusers from 
their own ranks.”). 
104 The Court of Appeals stated that: 
All members enter this service informed, fairly and reasonably, that they 
will be held to the strictest standards of probity and purity, over and 
above those already imposed on the police force at large.  They enter 
with professionally sophisticated eyes wide open to the reality that they 
will operate in fishbowl-like circumstances . . . .  The officers agree to 
undergo microscopic examinations of their personal lives, their financial 
affairs and their professional judgment calls.  Realistically, the proposed 
random drug testing in these narrow circumstances is just another layer 
of an already heightened, persistent and employee-expected scrutiny. 
Id. at 854. 
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sonable privacy intrusion without probable cause.105 
The capability of certain technologies to collect data is also a 
factor taken into account when measuring an individual’s expectation 
of privacy.106  The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Weav-
er,107 drew a line between human observation and technological sur-
veillance.108  It recognized the dramatic disparity in power between 
the two methods—it would take hundreds of police officers lined up 
at every corner to match the relentless tracking ability of a GPS de-
vice.109  Furthermore, the court emphasized that GPS tracking is an 
all-encompassing intrusion because a person’s location may divulge 
his or her political and religious views, sexual orientation, and health 
status, among other private information.110  Investigations of a vehi-
cle are generally unanticipated by the average citizen because there is 
a “sense of security and privacy” in traveling in one’s personal car.111 
Weaver adopted the reasoning of Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
in Katz, that an individual’s “subjective expectation of privacy” must 
be considered appropriate by society in order to invoke the protec-
tions under the constitution.112  Under the New York State Constitu-
tion, individuals “have a reasonable expectation that their every move 
will not be continuously and indefinitely monitored by a technical 
device without their knowledge.”113 
A location of the search is a key factor in determining wheth-
 
105 Id. at 855 (“[E]ach officer retains important personal rights of privacy in the imple-
mentation of this facially valid program and our decision in no way impinges on their 4th 
Amendment rights to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, 
homes, cars, lockers or other personal effects under traditional probable cause standards.”). 
106 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1201. 
107 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
108 Id. at 1199. 
109 Id. (“GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity, it facilitates a new 
technological perception of the world in which the situation of any object may be followed 
and exhaustively recorded over . . . a practically unlimited period.”). 
110 Id. at 1199 (explaining that a GPS device can create inferences from “trips to the psy-
chiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, 
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, the 
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”). 
111 Id. at 1201 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 143, 146) (“Many people spend more hours 
each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets.  Undoubtedly, many find a greater 
sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing them-
selves by pedestrian or other modes of travel.”). 
112 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1198; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
113 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1197-98. 
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er an individual’s expectation of privacy is legitimate.114  Yet, with 
the advancement of technology, the line between what is a public or 
private location has blurred.115  The court reasoned, however, that an 
individual’s expectation remains the same notwithstanding the pro-
gression of modern technology.116  If the government conducts a 
search in a secret manner and fails to provide any notice to the indi-
vidual, an expectation of privacy is still reasonable and the search 
would be constitutionally impermissible.117 
The Court of Appeals in Weaver also acknowledged that even 
a small expectation of privacy is sufficient to sustain a claim against 
an unreasonable search.118  To rule otherwise would make individuals 
susceptible to “enormous unsupervised intrusion[s] . . . upon personal 
privacy.”119  Most importantly, the court held that GPS searches re-
quire certain safeguards such as judicial oversight and a warrant to 
prevent the abuse of this technology.120  If individuals are subject to 
governmental interference every time they wish to drive in a person-
ally owned vehicle, “the security guaranteed by the constitution 
would be seriously” handicapped.121  As in Katz, the Court of Ap-
peals in Weaver held that a search must have prior judicial approval 
unless the particular set of facts qualifies within “specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions.”122  For example, the search 
would not violate the constitution if an emergency or exigent circum-
 
114 Id. 1198. 
115 Id. at 1200 (“[C]ontemporary technology [has] project[ed] our private activities into 
public space[s] . . . .”). 
116 Id. at 1200 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ‘keep[s] pace with the march of science.’ ”).  “[T]his 
change in venue has not . . . [caused] any diminution in the socially reasonable expectation 
that our communications and transactions will remain to a large extent private.”  Id. 
117 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200 (“Here, particularly, where there was no voluntary utiliza-
tion of the tracking technology, and the technology was surreptitiously installed, there exists 
no basis to find an expectation of privacy so diminished as to render constitutional concerns 
de minimis.”). 
118 Id. at 1201 (holding that the defendant’s minimal expectation in his vehicle was suffi-
cient to support his constitutional claim) (referring to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 
(2009) (“[A]lthough we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is 
less substantial than in his home . . . the former interest is nevertheless important and deserv-
ing of constitutional protection.”)). 
119 Id. at 1202. 
120 Id. at 1199, 1203 (holding that the unlimited power of the GPS technology partnered 
with its cheap assembly is a recipe for employer abuse). 
121 Id. at 1201 (quoting Delaware, 440 U.S. at 663). 
122 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1201 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357). 
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stance existed sufficient to trump the warrant requirement.123 
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED PROCEDURES 
A. Workplace Exception 
As the concurrence in Cunningham warned, the court’s deci-
sion not only unnecessarily expanded the boundaries of the “work-
place” to include locations and possessions outside the physical of-
fice, but it also relieved employers of the mandatory requirements 
that government authorities must follow in order to conduct a consti-
tutional search.124  This leaves government employees susceptible to 
an array of privacy invasions, so long as their employers can manipu-
late the surveillance to fit within the “workplace exception.”125 
1. Employer Control 
In reformulating the definition of the “workplace,” the majori-
ty in Cunningham purported to rely on reasoning used in O’Connor; 
yet, the cases in O’Connor involved possessions located exclusively 
within office buildings.126  Moreover, the Supreme Court held that an 
employee’s personal belongings, which are intended to be kept closed 
and private, are not considered part of the workplace, even if those 
items are on company-owned territory.127 
The employee’s car in Wiley was regularly used to transport 
employees and visitors which demonstrated that it was under the em-
 
123 Id. (“While there may and, likely will, be exigent situations in which the requirement 
of a warrant issued upon probable cause authorizing the use of GPS devices for the purpose 
of official criminal investigation will be excused, this is not one of them.  Plainly, no emer-
gency prompted the attachment of the Q-ball to defendant’s van.”). 
124 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 474 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring). 
125 Nat’l. Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 676 (referring to O’Connor, 480 
U.S. at 720-22 (“Although the term ‘work-related’ was used by the O’Connor Court, neither 
O’Connor nor the cases considered by the Court in reaching its holding involved any area 
physically outside of the workplace” until Cunningham was decided.)). 
126 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 471-72, 476 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16 (“A 
personal car is also not akin to a letter posted on a bulletin board, a photograph displayed on 
a desk, or other personal items an employee may bring within the ‘areas’ traditionally under-
stood as ‘part of the workplace context.’ ”)). 
127 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716 (distinguishing that “closed personal luggage, a handbag or 
a briefcase” is not part of the workplace). 
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ployer’s control and may have reduced the employee’s expectation of 
privacy.128  But, in Cunningham, the Department did not exert any 
authority over the car—it did not issue the vehicle to the employee, 
provide maintenance to ensure its workability, or pay for gas or mile-
age.129  Nor was Cunningham’s car used to store company-owned 
property or transport other employees.130  Even though the car was 
regularly driven home for family use, the court in Cunningham clas-
sified this personal vehicle under the “workplace exception” as if it 
were business property.131  Thus, the Court of Appeals disregarded 
both the law and the facts when it held that the employee’s personal 
car was part of the “workplace.” 
2. Sufficient Notice 
In Cunningham, the employee did not have notice that the 
Department could place a GPS device on his personal car to track his 
movements for an extended period of time.132  Unlike the police of-
ficers in Caruso, Cunningham was not forewarned that both his busi-
ness and private affairs would be monitored before accepting his po-
sition with the Department.133  Nor did Cunningham hold a high-risk 
position such as a paramilitary officer in the OCCB in Caruso or as a 
teacher in a correctional facility in Wiley.134  The Department made 
no attempt, not even by posted notice as in Wiley, to make Cunning-
ham aware that vehicles in lots surrounding the office could be 
 
128 Wiley, 328 F.3d at 1351. 
129 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 476-77 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) (demonstrating 
that the employer holds more control when the property is issued by the employer which 
lowers an employee’s expectation of privacy). 
130 Id. at 476 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715, and rejecting the argument that em-
ployees who use their cars to take care of “work-related obligations place those cars within 
the ambit of their ‘employer[s’] control’ such that they could be subjected to a warrantless 
search”). 
131 Id. at 472, 477. 
132 Id. at 470. 
133 Id.  Contra Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 854 (“All members enter this service informed, fair-
ly and reasonably, that they will be held to the strictest standards of probity and purity.”). 
134 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 710 (stating that employment positions implemented for the 
purpose of “supervision, control, and . . . efficient operation of the workplace” may alert em-
ployees to special circumstances that may allow for unwarranted searches); see Cunningham, 
997 N.E.2d at 470; see also Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 850, 853; see also Wiley, 328 F.3d at 
1347-48. 
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searched without a warrant.135 
While it is true that the requirement of employee time sheets 
in Cunningham lessened Cunningham’s expectation of privacy in his 
whereabouts during work hours, a time sheet does not serve the same 
purpose as a prior agreement or contract.136  In O’Connor, the Court 
only permitted a search in the absence of notice or a warrant because 
it involved government-owned property.137  Yet, the court in Cun-
ningham took the O’Connor holding out of context by applying the 
workplace exception to personal property rather than state proper-
ty.138  This leaves the employee without any guidelines for determin-
ing his or her “reasonable expectation of privacy.”139  Cunningham 
had no reason to foresee any type of search of his vehicle because of 
the lack of notice, and therefore, the Court of Appeals should not 
have applied the workplace exception to his personal vehicle.140 
B. Privacy Protections 
Whether a search is used to investigate work-related or crimi-
nal misconduct or simply to follow-up on a routine business matter, 
each search subjects the employee to a possible infringement of con-
stitutional rights.141  Because government employers can escape the 
judicial scrutiny that necessarily accompanies the warrant require-
ment by means of the “workplace exception,” they are given greater 
privileges than those of our police.142  Even though public employers 
may not be “in the business of investigating the violation of criminal 
laws,” they have been given the discretion to act as law enforcement 
officials while conducting investigations of their employees.143  This 
 
135 Wiley, 328 F.3d at 1351.  The employer posted a notice in the parking lot to alert em-
ployees of a possible search of their vehicles.  Contra Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470. 
136 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472.  Contra Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 851 (stating employ-
ees “would have to sign a form acknowledging their understanding that periodic drug testing 
is a condition of membership in the Bureau”). 
137 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 712-13, 728. 
138 Id. at 715-16; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472. 
139 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360; see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16. 
140 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470; contra Wiley, 328 F.3d at 1351 (finding that employ-
er provided notice to employee of a foreseeable search and, thus, the workplace exception set 
forth in O’Connor applied). 
141 Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 858-59. 
142 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. 
143 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 722. 
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loophole has been justified by the fact that lower courts have histori-
cally upheld “any ‘work-related’ search.”144  But, such dictum is fal-
lacious because it assumes that a search satisfies the Fourth Amend-
ment “reasonableness” standard simply because the investigation is 
performed by an employer.145 
1. Burden on the Employer 
The Supreme Court in O’Connor may have incorrectly sug-
gested that it is a “common-sense realization that government offices 
could not function if every employment decision became a constitu-
tional matter.”146  Conversely, as a result of technological advances, 
obtaining a warrant is no longer a time-consuming and onerous 
task.147  In fact, business practices could be further disrupted if em-
ployers are routinely forced to litigate the “reasonableness” of their 
searches.148  If an employer, without too much difficulty, may elimi-
nate unreasonable surveillance of its employees’ private activities, 
such as by providing an employee with a GPS device capable of be-
ing turned off during personal activities, it is only reasonable for the 
warrant requirement to be upheld.149 
2. Privacy Intrusion to the Employee 
It is undisputed that investigating the existence of an employ-
ee’s misconduct is a legitimate interest of a state employer.150  Never-
theless, the one-sided information extracted by a GPS search invites 
misunderstandings and judgments against employees and, in turn, can 
 
144 Id. at 720-21. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 722 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
147 United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 588 (10th Cir. 1983).  The availability of tele-
phonic warrants may diminish the burden placed on the employer to obtain a judicial order. 
148 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1201.  Even a minimal expectation of privacy is sufficient to 
sustain a claim against an unreasonable search. 
149 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473 (“It would be impossible, or unreasonably difficult, so 
to limit a GPS search of an employee's car as to eliminate all surveillance of private activity 
especially when the employee chooses to go home in the middle of the day.”). 
150 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Public employers have an in-
terest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the 
work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanage-
ment, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees.”). 
21
Broughton: A “Workplace Exception”
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
764 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
impair or negatively affect an individual’s career and livelihood.151  
Intimate information which an employee may seek to keep private 
can now be analyzed under an employer’s microscope through GPS 
searches.152 
The critical problem with the information retrieved by GPS 
searches is the fact that employees do not have the chance to rebut 
assumptions made about the employee based on his location because 
searches are conducted without the employee’s knowledge or con-
sent.153  Moreover, when employees become aware that their employ-
er has the capability of watching their every move, these surveil-
lances will chill their First Amendment freedoms.154  Employees will 
be reluctant to visit certain places during the workday for fear that 
their travels or even interactions with others may be used against 
them.155  Employees now have a new task after the expansion of the 
“workplace exception” in Cunningham: to look over their shoulders 
and check their vehicles and belongings for hidden GPS devices.156  
Further still, without appropriate safeguards, what will prevent this 
precedent from creating a slippery slope for even more invasive 
tracking methods?157 
 
151 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 474 (quoting Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199-1200) (“What 
the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly detailed 
profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—political, re-
ligious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional 
and avocational pursuits.”); Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199 (“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will 
be trips [of] indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure . . . .”). 
152 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199 (“GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory ca-
pacity, it facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which the situation of any 
object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over . . . a practically unlimited period.”). 
153 Id. (explaining that an employer may create assumptions about an employee based on 
his or her “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treat-
ment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, the synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”); see Cunning-
ham, 997 N.E.2d at 470. 
154 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[A]wareness that the Govern-
ment may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”). 
155 Id. at 955-56 (“The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for 
information years into the future.”). 
156 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 476 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) (“There is now little 
to prevent a government employer from placing a GPS device on that person’s bag, brief-
case, shoe, cell phone, watch, or purse—anything that is used during the workday (like peti-
tioner’s car)—to determine whether, based on the tracking data transmitted by that device, 
the employee is located where he or she purports to be.”). 
157 The concurrence in Cunningham cautioned: 
No New York court has ever permitted government employers to search 
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3. Safeguards 
The Court of Appeals in Cunningham neglected to implement 
sufficient safeguards against future searches.  An individual’s privacy 
rights under the constitution must be protected by a judicial order ab-
sent an exception to the warrant requirement or an agreement that 
sufficiently alerts the employee of the possibility of a search.158  Only 
a detached and neutral magistrate has the ability to determine whether 
a search is “reasonable” at its inception while enforcing safeguards to 
prevent a constitutional violation in advance.159  The absence of 
probable cause and a warrant requirement only allows the judge to 
analyze a search’s “reasonableness” by pure speculation after an em-
ployee’s rights have already been violated.160  Additionally, in con-
gruence with the O’Connor rationale, the “workplace exception” 
should be limited to the confines of the company offices if the em-
ployer chooses not to obtain a warrant.161 
Employers should also be required to provide sufficient notice 
to their employees of any possibility of a search by the employer 
without a warrant.162  This can be done by mutual agreement between 
the employer and employee.163  Likewise, a bargained-for contractual 
provision would benefit the employer, because it goes toward satisfy-
ing Due Process notice requirements and can demonstrate foreseea-
bility.164 
 
employees’ personal cars without a warrant, and the majority creates a 
dangerous precedent by allowing them to do so now.  The ramifications 
of the majority’s decision will extend far beyond this case.  All govern-
ment employees, at all levels, in all three branches of government, may 
now be subject to electronic surveillance based upon a mere “reasona-
bleness” standard, without any judicial oversight at the inception of the 
search.  Given the majority’s imprimatur of warrantless GPS tracking, 
less intrusive methods for investigating government employees will al-
most certainly be replaced with electronic surveillance.  The potential for 
abuse that we recognized in Weaver is now closer to becoming a reality. 
Id. at 477. 
158 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see also Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 851, 854. 
159 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
160 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. 
161 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16. 
162 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will 
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
163 Caruso, 530 N.E.2d at 851, 854. 
164 Id. 
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Finally, the privacy rights of individuals should continuously 
be reevaluated in light of rapid advances in technology.165  With the 
progression of technology, substantial privacy intrusions are now a 
regular occurrence without any physical trespass.166  Rather than re-
maining stagnant, the protections granted under the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the 
New York Constitution should be reexamined by the legislature in 
consideration of the many boundaries that are repeatedly being sur-
passed by modern methods.167  The law must progress along with the 
advancement of technology to ensure that the protections that existed 
during its enactment still remain intact today.168 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The New York Court of Appeals was correct in holding that 
the search conducted by the Department was overly intrusive and un-
reasonable under both the New York State and United States Consti-
tutions.169  Holding otherwise would allow government officials to 
conduct searches of individuals that exceed what is necessary in order 
to accomplish routine or investigatory tasks.170  Moreover, suppress-
ing the evidence as a whole will serve to deter employers from con-
ducting searches that are unreasonable in scope.171 
However, placing Cunningham’s personal vehicle within the 
“workplace exception” could provide employers with overbroad dis-
cretion in conducting employee searches.172  It allows an employer to 
track its employees’ movements outside of work premises and also 
compile intimate information that is unrelated to the search’s pur-
pose.173  Likewise, a search conducted for criminal or work-related 
 
165 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
166 Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
167 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic 
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.  A legislative 
body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to bal-
ance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see 
also N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12. 
168 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964. 
169 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 473. 
172 Id. at 472-76 (quoting Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 441-42). 
173 Id. 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/7
2015 A “WORKPLACE EXCEPTION” 767 
 
misconduct should not be distinguished because each instance leaves 
the employee vulnerable to the same privacy intrusions.174  After all, 
in the very case at bar, the government failed to halt surveillance 
when the employee was clearly on personal time.175  Such abuses are 
easily capable of repetition, particularly with no oversight in place.176  
Hence, government employers should be held to the same accounta-
bility as police officers in ensuring that an individual’s privacy rights 
are not violated by excessive intrusions. 
The Court of Appeals neglected to provide sufficient safe-
guards to prevent privacy intrusions in the first place.  Constitutional 
violations may be curtailed by simply requiring government employ-
ers to notify employees of their rights at the commencement of em-
ployment, which, in turn, could reduce the burdens on both the court 
system and employers.  If nothing else, at least such notice would 
give candidates for public sector employment the ability to make in-
formed decisions. 
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174 Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 477 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) (“All government 
employees, at all levels, in all three branches of government, may now be subject to electron-
ic surveillance based upon a mere ‘reasonableness’ standard, without any judicial oversight . 
. . .”). 
175 Id. 
176 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. 
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